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CHOICE OF LAW GOVERNING LAND TRANSACTIONS:
THE CONTRACT-CONVEYANCE DICHOTOMY
In choosing the law to govern multistate land transactions, most
courts have held that a conveyance of an interest in land and all issues
concerning title are governed by the law of the situs,' whereas contracts
to convey are governed by the choice-of-law rules normally applied to
contract cases.2 Courts have thus sought to characterize a transaction as
affecting either interests in land or the rights of parties inter se. However,
the fact that many land transactions can fit comfortably into either char-
acterization 3 demonstrates the inadequacy of the contract-conveyance
dichotomy as the sole choice-of-law rule.
There has been increasing recognition that transactions are properly
regulated by the law of the state having the more significant contacts with
them.4  By uncovering the purposes of conflicting local laws, it is usually
possible to appraise the significance of various contacts and determine
which state has the greatest interest in having its law applied.5 It is along
these lines that courts should seek to replace the predominantly
mechanistic application of the contract-conveyance dichotomy to land
transactions. When diverse local laws vie for recognition in a given case,
not only should the specific purposes of the conflicting rules be analyzed,
but also consideration should be given to the reasons which originally led to
the distinction between transactions affecting interests in land and those
affecting rights of parties inter se. In particular, a state's interest in
obtaining certainty and uniformity with respect to title to land situated
IE.g., Wilson v. Kryger, 29 N.D. 28, 149 N.W. 721 (1914), aff'd, 242 U.S. 171
(1916) ; Clark v. Graham, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 577 (1821) ; United States v. Crosby,
11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 115 (1812). See generally GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 148
(3d ed. 1949).
2 E.g., Liljedahl v. Glassgow, 190 Iowa 827, 180 N.W. 870 (1921); Atwood v.
Walker, 179 Mass. 514, 61 N.E. 58 (1901) ; Polson v. Stewart, 167 Mass. 211, 45
N.E. 737 (1897); Walsh v. Selover, Bates & Co., 109 Minn. 136, 123 N.W. 291
(1909), aff'd, 226 U.S. 112 (1912). See generally GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS
§ 149 (3d ed. 1949); LEFLAR, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 144 (1959).
3 Compare Selover, Bates & Co. v. Walsh, 226 U.S. 112 (1912), with Kryger v.
Wilson, 242 U.S. 171 (1916). Compare Polson v. Stewart, supra note 2, with Kyle
v. Kyle, 128 So. 2d 427 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1961), appeal dismissed, 139 So. 2d 885
(1962). See p. 483 infra.
4 [Dletermining which contact is the most significant . . . requires the
exercise of an informed judgment in the balancing of all the interests of the
states with the most significant contacts in order best to accommodate
the equities among the parties to the policies of those states.
Vanston Comm. v. Green, 329 U.S. 156, 161-62 (1946) ; see Fricke v. Isbrandtsen Co.,
151 F. Supp. 465 (S.D.N.Y. 1957); Auten v. Auten, 308 N.Y. 155, 160-61, 124
N.E.2d 99, 102 (1954). See generally RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), CONFLICT or LAWS
§ 332(b) (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1960).
5 See generally Currie, Notes on Methods and Objectives in the Conflict of Laws,
1959 DuKE L.J. 171, 173-80.
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within it ' should be weighed against the interest of another state in regu-
lating the activity of its residents or the performance of contracts within
its borders. 7 To lump indiscriminately such dissimilar issues as capacity
to contract, applicability of a statute of frauds, and assumption of
a mortgage into one category--contracts-is to disregard the differing
state interests manifested in various local laws.
It is the purpose of this Note to underscore the inadequacy of the
contract-conveyance dichotomy as a ubiquitous choice-of-law rule,. to
evaluate the departure from existing law propounded by the most recent
draft of the Restatement of Conflict of Laws, and to suggest an approach
by which contacts and state interests, cast in the light of the purposes of
local laws, may be weighed in concrete fact situations.
I. INADEQUACY OF THE CONTRAcT-CONVEYANcE DICHOTOMY
Too many land transactions can too easily be characterized as affect-
ing both interests in land and rights of parties. In Polson v. Stewart,
s
the case generally cited as establishing the contract-conveyance dichotomy,
a husband contracted with his wife at their North Carolina domicile to
release all his marital rights in her land located in Massachusetts. Because.
the contract was construed to be "personal" rather than one affecting
property interests, a Massachusetts court applied North Carolina law
validating the agreement rather than Massachusetts law which would have
invalidated any husband-wife contract.9  In the recent case of Kyle v.
Kyle,10 the court applied situs law to reach a contrary result on similar
facts. An antenuptial contract releasing dower rights-valid in the
domicile where made but invalid in the situs-forum-was held to have a
"direct relationship" to the property in the forum even though the prop-
erty was acquired several years after the contract. There is a danger
that such use of either-or characterization in choice of law may mask the
insubstantiality of a forum's contacts with a transaction.
There is also a risk that the determination whether a contract affects
interests in land or personal rights may turn on merely the remedy sought.
In two leading cases, Selover, Bates & Co. v. Walsh ' and Kryger v.
Wilson,22 the issue was whether there was proper notice of termination of
a contract to convey land in one state made and to be performed in
another. In Selover, because the action was for damages for breach of
6 RESTATEMENT (SECOND), CONFLICT OF LAWS, Introductory Note, at 13 (Tent.
Draft No. 5, 1959). See generally Goodrich, Two States and Real Estate, 89 U. PA.
L. REv. 417, 418-19 (1941).
7 See Selover, Bates & Co..v. Walsh, 226 U.S. 112 (1912).
8 167 Mass. 211, 45 N.E. 737 (1897) (Holmes, J.).
9 Id. at 214-15, 45 N.E. at 738.
1o 128 So. ?d 427 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1961), appeal dismissed, 139 So. 2d 885
(Fla. 1962).
11226 U.S. 112 (1912).
12242 U.S. 171 (1916).
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contract, the forum applied its own law as the law of the place of con-
tracting. 13 In Kryger, because the action was to quiet title, the situs-forum
applied its own law rather than the law of the state of the parties'
domicile and the making and performance of the contract. 14 The Supreme
Court affirmed both cases, noting in Kryger that choice of law is a matter
of local common law.' 5  Since the Court in Kryger expressly recognized
that the crucial issue concerned the required notice of termination, 16 the
states' conflicting interests in having their notice requirements applied
should have been analyzed. Although notice of termination might seem to
involve personal rights, the case was held to involve interests in land
since the remedy sought was quieting title. Characterization should not be
the sole determinant of choice of law when a case falls readily into either
category. Indeed, characterization conceals the underlying issues of a
conflicts case by furnishing an apparently neat and logical solution without
providing any ready-made tools of analysis. Often it serves as a device
for the application of forum law.
II. DEFECTS IN THE RESTATEMENT'S RATIONALE FOR AN EXPANDED
SITUs RULE
The basic problem in choice of law governing immovables concerns
the weight to be accorded the situs contact.17 It is universally agreed that
situs law should govern conveyances.' 8 The most recent draft of the
Restatement of Conflict of Laws has departed from existing law by making
situs also determinative of choice of law in most cases involving contracts
to convey.' 9 Although the Restatement appears to be following the contract-
conveyance dichotomy by framing a special rule for contracts to convey,
it undercuts the classical dichotomy by giving such weight to the situs
contact that the local law of the situs will almost always govern.20  Yet,
when the purposes of local laws are examined and applied in specific
factual contexts, situs may become a relatively insignificant contact in
relation to a contract-to-convey issue.
'3 109 Minn. 136, 123 N.W. 291 (1909), aff'd, 226 U.S. 112 (1912).
14 29 N.D. 28, 149 N.W. 721 (1914), aff'd, 242 U.S. 171 (1916).
15242 U.S. 171, 176 (1916).
16 Ibid,
17 Compare Goodrich, supra note 6, with RESTATEMENT (SECOND), CONFLICT OF
LAWS §346(e) (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1960).
18 E.g., GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 148 (3d ed. 1949); LEFLAR, CONFLICT
OF LAWS § 140 (1959) ; STUMBERG, CONFLICT OF LAWS 377 (2d ed. 1951).
19RESTATEMENT (SECOND), CONFLICT OF LAWS §346(e) (Tent. Draft No. 6,
1960).
20 See id. § 346(e), comment c & illustrations 3-6. Reference to the local law
of the situs differs significantly from reference to whatever law the situs applies,
including possible use of renvoi. Compare id. § 346(e), comment d and § 332, com-
ment e (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1960), with RESTATEMENT (SECOND), CONFLICT OF LAWS
§ 215, comment b and §§ 215-21 (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1959). Reference to the whole
law of the situs furnishes no guidance as to the local law the situs should apply. Cf.
Cavers, The Conditional Seller's Remedies and the Choice-of-Law Process--Some
Notes on Shaiahan, 35 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1126, 1135-36 (1960).
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The Restatement's expanded situs rule rests on the theory that land
is subject only to the jurisdiction of the courts of the state in which it is
situated.2 1  Courts have often found a nexus between jurisdiction and
choice of law in land transactions, possibly because it might be futile for
a non-situs forum to apply its law and decree that land in another state
be conveyed if enforcement of the decree would require further legal
action in the situs state whose law voids the conveyance.22  However, a
collectible money judgment can be as effective a means for a non-situs
court to affect interests in land as a decree for specific performance.
23
Moreover, situs courts usually acknowledge the validity of a deed given in
compliance with a non-situs decree when the grantor seeks to have the
deed declared void on the ground of duress.24 Perhaps situs courts should,
therefore, grant specific performance pursuant to a foreign decree since
there is no greater intrusion on a state's control over land when a foreign
decree is given effect than when a deed in compliance with such a decree
is given effect. 25  Courts have long been willing to decree that foreign land
be conveyed,26 and expanding concepts of jurisdiction and full faith and
credit have increasingly motivated situs courts to effectuate such decrees 2
According to a succession of commentators, foreign land decrees based on
personal jurisdiction are entitled to full faith and credit.28 Thus, there
seems to be little support for the Restatement's view that the situs has
"exclusive control" over land.29
2 1 RESTATEMENT (SECOND), CONFLICT OF LAWS, Introductory Note, at 13 (Tent.
Draft No. 5, 1959) ; 2 BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 214.1, at 938-39 (1935).22 Losson v. Blodgett, 1 Cal. App. 2d 13, 36 P.2d 147 (Dist. Ct App. 1934);
Poison v. Stewart, 167 Mass. 211, 214-15, 45 N.E. 737, 738 (1897) (dictum).23 Currie, Full Faith and Credit to Foreign Land Decrees, 21 U. CatL L. R, v.
620, 669-70 (1954) ; Note, Choice of Law for Land Transactions, 38 COLUM. L. REV.
1049, 1051 (1938).
24 See Currie, supra note 23, at 628-29.
25 Id. at 629.
26 See, e.g., Penn v. Lord Baltimore, 1 Ves. Sr. 444, 27 Eng. Rep. 1132 (Ch.
1750). Such a decree may be based on defendant's wrong within the forum. E.g.,
Irving Trust Co. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 83 F.2d 168, 172 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 299
U.S. 571 (1936); Lord Cranstown v. Johnston, 3 Ves. Jr. 170, 30 Eng. Rep. 952
(1796).2 7 Simmons v. Superior Court, 96 Cal. App. 2d 119, 128, 214 P.2d 844, 851
(Dist. Ct. App. 1950); Redwood Investment Co. v. Exley, 64 Cal. App. 455, 221
Pac. 973 (1923); Matson v. Matson, 186 Iowa 607, 173 N.W. 127 (1919); Mallette
v. Scheerer, 164 Wis. 415, 160 N.W. 182 (1916). But see, e.g., McRary v. McRary,
228 N.C. 714, 47 S.E.2d 27 (1948); Clouse v. Clouse, 185 Tenn. 666, 207 S.W.2d
576 (1948).
28 Barbour, The Extra-Territorial Effect of the Equitable Decree, 17 Mica. L.
REv. 527 (1919); Currie, Full Faith and Credit to Foreign Land Decrees, 21 U. Cr.
L. REv. 620 (1954) ; Goodrich, Enforcement of a Foreign Equitable Decree, 5 IowA
L. BULL. 230 (1920); Lorenzen, Application of Full Faith and Credit Clause to
Equitable Decrees for the Conveyance of Foreign Land, 34 YALE L.J. 591 (1925).
The issue has not yet been determined by the Supreme Court. The narrow holding
of Fall v. Eastin, 215 U.S. 1 (1909), is that full faith and credit need not be given
a prior judgment determining rights in land when the present suit concerns rights
of a grantee of one of the former parties. See generally Goodrich, Two States
and Real Estate, 89 U. PA. L. REv. 417, 428 n.50 (1941).
2 9 RESTATEMENT (SECOND), CONFLICT OF LAWS, Introductory Note, at 12 (Tent.
Draft No. 5, 1959). It was recognized over twenty years ago that choice of law
concerning immovables should not be based on concepts of jurisdiction. Goodrich,
supra note 28, at 419 n.12; Note, supra note 23, at 1051.
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Situs is also stressed by the Restatement on the theory that immov-
ables are of greatest concern to the state in which they are situated. Al-
though there may be a legitimate and substantial situs concern when the
issue is the direct effect of a conveyance on title,
30 if it is clear that a case
directly involves only personal rights,3' the interest of a state in regulating
the rights of its domiciliaries may outweigh the interest of the situs state in
regulating immovables.
Finally, the Restatement has given greatest weight to the situs
contact to satisfy the need for certainty and convenience
32 -it is far
easier to determine in what state land is situated than to determine the
place of contracting. The Restatement's rationale is persuasive when the
issue involves title since certainty in the effect of prior conveyances is
essential in establishing a chain of title. But when title is not directly in-
volved, it may be preferable to sacrifice certainty in a search for the
proper law of a particular case-the law of the state having the most sig-
nificant contacts with the transaction and the greatest interest in having
its law applied to the specific facts. Furthermore, a rule requiring in-
eluctable application of situs law cannot provide predictability in all cases
because many courts, recognizing that a non-situs state has more sig-
nificant contacts, have refused to apply the rule uniformly
33
III. WEIGHING OF CONTACTS: CONTRACTS TO CONVEY
Most courts have held that issues related to the contract to convey
are governed by the law normally applied to contracts.
34 Occasionally,
courts have indicated that every issue concerning an immovable is gov-
erned by the law of the situs; 
35 but in some of the cases, situs law has
been applied to a contract to convey when that same law would also have
been chosen under the jurisdiction's contract rule.
36 The Restatenment
provides that when the parties are separately domiciled, the law of the
situs is applied even if execution of the contract to convey, delivery of the
deed, and payment are non-situs contacts.
37  Giving such weight to the
30 See pp. 490, 495 infra.
31 See, e.g., pp. 492-93 infra, on assumption of a mortgage.
32 RESTATEMENT (SECOND), CONFLICT OF LAWS, Introductory Note, at 13 (Tent.
Draft No. 5, 1959).
33 E.g., Liljedahl v. Glassgow, 190 Iowa 827, 180 N.W. 870 (1921) (assumption
of mortgage governed by law of place where agreement was executed and was 
to be
satisfied); Atwood v. Walker, 179 Mass. 514, 61 N.E. 58 (1901) (damages 
when
vendor unable to furnish good title governed by law of place of contracting) 
; Poison
v. Stewart, 167 Mass. 211, 45 N.E. 737 (1897) (wife's capacity to 
contract with
husband governed by law of domicile of spouses and place of contracting) 
; Walsh v.
Selover, Bates & Co., 109 Minn. 136, 123 N.W. 291 (1909), aff'd, 
226 U.S. 112
(1912) (termination of contract of sale governed by lav of place of 
making and
performing contract).
34 See cases cited note 33 supra.
35 See, e.g., Coral Gables, Inc. v. Hanley, 87 F.2d 780 (6th Cir. 1937).
36 See, e.g., Hamilton v. Glassell, 57 F.2d 1032 (5th Cir. 1932) (dictum).
37 RESTATE MENT (SECOND), CONFLICT OF LAWS § 346(e), comment c, illustration 6
(Tent. Draft No. 6, 1960).
1963] CHOICE OF LAW GOVERNING LAND TRANSACTIONS 487
situs can only be justified as a means of securing uniformity and predict-
ability; however, courts are unlikely to deviate from the traditional rule
which requires application of the law of the state having the contacts of
execution, delivery, and payment.38 Moreover, the state in which perform-
ance is to occur normally has the greatest interest in regulating the effect
of non-performance within its borders.39 The situs state's interest in
regulating title is not involved since the contract is breached before there
is any conveyance affecting title.
Courts too often ignore the contact of domicile, a failing which is
especially unfortunate when a pertinent state statute was specifically de-
signed to protect domiciliaries rather than to regulate transactions. 40
For example, a statute providing a period within which to comply
with a contract to convey before it can be terminated may indicate a state
interest in protecting domiciliaries. 4
1  In Kryger v. Wilson, 4 2 the situs
forum applied local law because the remedy sought was quieting title. The
Court's express recognition that the crucial issue involved the required
notice of termination 43 indicated the need for analysis of the states' inter-
ests in having their notice requirements applied. 44 Not only was the pur-
chaser domiciled in the non-situs state which had a notice of termination
requirement affording greater protection,45 but the contract was made and
was to be performed within that state. The situs state's interest in quiet-
ing title need not compel application of situs law since title is quieted no
38 See cases cited note 33 supra.
39 The state in which the deed is to be delivered and installments are to be paid
has an interest in seeing that the contract is carried out and in regulating the conse-
quences of a willful breach. Frequently the state of performance and the state of
making the contract are the same. When they are not, the contact of performance
probably should be given the greater weight. Courts following the early rule that
the place of making governs contracts, frequently apply the law of a state having little
interest in regulating the contract. See, e.g., Milliken v. Pratt, 125 Mass. 374 (1878).
See generally Currie, Married Women's Contracts: A Study in Conflict-of-Laws
Method, 25 U. Cmi. L. Rav. 227, 235 (1958). More recently, courts applying "the
law of the contract" may have meant the law of the place of performance instead of
the law of the place of making. That the quoted phrase may have either or both
meanings was pointed out in Pritchard v. Norton, 106 U.S. 124, 136 (1882) (dictum).
4 0 When a breach by a vendor domiciled in the situs state is caused not by an
unwillingness to convey but by an inability resulting from a defect in title, the situs
state has a significant interest in protecting the local vendor who in good faith made
a contract to convey believing that he had good title. The vendor is most likely
to be a domiciliary of the state in which his land is situated. But if he is domiciled
in the state of performance, that state has an interest in protecting him by a good
faith rule of nominal damages and expenses instead of profits lost. In a leading case,
Atwood v. Walker, 179 Mass. 514, 61 N.E. 58 (1901), the situs forum applied the
nominal damages rule of New York, in which the contract was made and the deed
was to be delivered, without considering whether the vendor was a domiciliary of
Massachusetts. If he was and his home state did not protect him, there would seem
to be no reason why its court should have applied New York law protecting vendors.
41 See Selover, Bates & Co. v. Walsh, 226 U.S. 112 (1912).
42242 U.S. 171 (1916).
43 Id. at 174.
4 See text accompanying note 16 supra.
4 5 Both statutes required written notice of termination and thirty days within
which to perform after receiving notice, but only the situs state permitted notice by
publication. See Kryger v. Wilson, 242 U.S. 171 (1916).
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matter which statute is applied. Even the Restatement does not require
that situs law be applied when situs is the state's only contact with the
contract.
48
A. Capacity to Contract4
At one time a court would apply a local statute or common-law rule
providing that married women were incapable of making valid conveyances
without considering whether it was intended to apply to the particular
facts in issue.4s In Proctor v. Frost,49 however, a situs court of State X
recognized that a local statute voiding a married woman's mortgage of her
land as surety for her husband's debt was designed to protect only local
domiciliaries; i therefore, the court applied the law of State Y in which
the mortgagor was domiciled, had executed the bond and mortgage, and
was competent.31 Actually, there was no true conflict in the case; since
the forum had no interest in protecting a non-domiciliary,
52 the interest
of State Y in upholding the contract could be freely effectuated.
53
When the married woman is domiciled in X, however, and State Y
has some significant contact with the contract, there is a real conflict be-
tween X law which seeks to protect the wife and Y law which enforces
such a contract. Although state legislators, who are normally concerned
with purely local transactions, 5 4 probably envisioned the X statute as
applicable only when all relevant contacts-domicile, place of making or
performing the contract, and situs-were within X, an X forum can be
expected to apply the statute even if one contact, the making or perform-
ance, was in Y.5 5 The policy underlying a statute voiding a married
woman's mortgage of her land as surety for her husband's debt is to
46 RESTATEMENT (SECOND), CONFLICT OF LAWS § 346(e), comment c & illustra-
tion 2 (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1960).
47 Although this subject now has little practical significance due to the removal
by most states of restrictions on the capacity of married women to contract, treat-
ment is justified if it can aid current classroom discussion of capacity as a problem
in choice-of-law method. Detachment from controversial local policy perhaps facili-
tates analysis of method. Currie, supra note 39, at 227-28.
48 See, e.g., Swank v. Hufnagle, 111 Ind. 453, 13 N.E. 105 (1887); Smith v.
Ingram, 130 N.C. 100, 40 S.E. 984 (1902).
49 89 N.H. 304, 197 At. 813 (1938).
50 See id. at 307-08, 197 Atl. at 815.
5' Accord, Poison v. Stewart, 167 Mass. 211, 45 N.E. 737 (1897); Merrielles v.
State Bank, 5 Tex. Civ. App. 483, 24 S.W. 564 (1893).
52 See 89 N.H. 304, 307-08, 197 Atl. 813, 815 (193R).
53 Cf. Currie, supra note 39, at 260-61.
44 Bernkrant v. Fowler, 55 Cal. 2d 588, 594, 360 P.2d 906, 909, 12 Cal. Rptr.
266, 269 (1961) (dictum) ; Currie, supra note 39, at 230-31.
55 The court could argue that the interest of the forum state in protecting domi-
ciliaries is as great as that in Emery v. Burbank, 163 Mass. 326, 39 N.E. 1026 (1895),
in which a court applied the local statute of frauds to prevent a local testator from
being bound by an alleged oral contract made elsewhere. Accord, Bernkrant v.
Fowler, 55 Cal. 2d 588. 594. 360 P.2d 906, 909, 12 Cal. Rptr. 266, 269 (1961) (dictum) ;
Rubin v. Irving Trust Co., 305 N.Y. 288, 113 N.E.2d 424 (1953). However, Y
courts have enforced married women's contracts valid where made (in Y) although
invalid in the domicile (X). See, e.g., Conner v. Elliott, 79 Fla. 513, 85 So. 164,
petition for cert. dismissed, 254 U.S. 665 (1920).
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foster domestic tranquility by ensuring that a husband will not force his
wife to make a contract benefiting him, and the spouses' domicile has the
greatest interest in promoting marital harmony. On the other hand, if
the deed is to be delivered in Y, payments are to be made there, and the
other party is domiciled there, Y has both a protective interest and an
interest in upholding a contract to be performed within its borders. In
such a case, the contacts and interests of the two states are evenly balanced.
In practice, a party seeking to hold a married woman to her contract will
sue in Y whose law validates the contract, provided that personal juris-
diction can be obtained over the X domiciliary. The Y forum probably
will apply Y law on the basis of its contacts, interests, and the presumption
that the X domiciliary intended to make a binding contract rather than to
deceive and thus would have intended Y law to govern had she considered
the conflict-of-laws problem.5 6 Although enforcement of all contracts on
the ground of upholding the expectation of the parties would undercut
X's policy of protecting married women and maintaining domestic tran-
quility, the use of presumed intent has been supported by many writers.57
Choice-of-law rules can provide no easy solution hereY8 Yet by eschewing
the contract-conveyance dichotomy and considering the purposes and
scope of local laws in order to weigh interests and contacts, courts can at
least ensure that relevant but conflicting policies will not be overlooked.
If the situs as well as the place of contracting is in Y, it is possible
that the X statute was not intended to apply. 9 Of course, if plaintiff must
sue in X because personal jurisdiction over the X domiciliary cannot be
obtained in Y, the X court may well hold that X's policy of protecting
domiciliaries is strong enough to compel application of X law even though
domicile is X's only contact. 60 This approach by the forum has been roundly
criticised,61 mainly because of Y's significant interest in upholding a contract
which the parties presumably intended to be valid. But Y's interest is not
significantly stronger than in the preceding hypothetical if the situs con-
tact is not deemed crucial in this area. The argument that the situs has
an interest in the uniform application of situs law to ensure certainty of
titles to local land is not compelling here, for legal title is not affected until
56 See, e.g., Poole v. Perkins, 126 Va. 331, 101 S.E. 240 (1919).
57 Ehrenzweig, Contractual Capacity of Married Women and Infants in the Con-
flict of Laws, 43 MINN. L. Rv. 899, 901 (1959); Williams, Land Contracts in the
Conflict of Laws-Lex Situs: Rule or Exception, 11 HAsrINws L.J. 159, 168 (1959) ;
Note, Choice of Law for Land Transactions, 38 CoLum. L. REv. 1049, 1055 (1938).
58 Professor Currie suggests that in such a case each forum should effectuate
local policy. Currie, supra note 39, at 261-62.
59 See note 54 supra and accompanying text. Cf. Poole v. Perkins, 126 Va. 331,
333, 101 S.E.2d 240, 242 (1919) (dictum) (lack of capacity to contract under law
of domicile not applicable when contract made in another state).
60 Cf. cases cited note 55 supra. Professor Currie would approve X's action.
See Currie, supra note 39, at 261-62.
61 Cf., e.g., Ehrenzweig, The Statute of Frauds in the Conflict of Laws: Basic
Rule of Validation, 59 CoLum. L. REv. 874, 880 (1959) ; Lorenzen, The Statute of
Frauds and the Conflict of Laws, 32 YALE L.J. 311, 335-37 (1923); Comment, The
Statute of Frauds in the Conflict of Laws, 43 CALu'. L. Rzv. 295, 302, 304 (1955).
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there is a conveyance subsequent to the contract to convey.
62 Moreover,
since many courts, following the dichotomy, now apply the law of the
place of contracting, pre-litigation certainty can be assured by continued
application of that law. If suit on the contract is brought, there will be
no uncertainty of title regardless of the result since only one party will be
awarded the right to the land. If X upholds the contract to convey and
the grantor refuses to comply, there may be post-litigation uncertainty,
but only until ' decides whether to follow persuasive authority for enforc-
ing the foreign decree. 63
B. Capacity to Convey 64
The issue of capacity to convey, rather than to contract to convey,
requires greater emphasis on the situs contact since the situs state has a
significant interest in regulating conveyances directly affecting title to local
land. Title searching is facilitated if the situs law pertaining to capacity
to convey is applied to all conveyances. Since deeds are recorded near
the situs, title searches are commonly made by lawyers most familiar with
situs law. The lack of a definite conflict-of-laws rule detracts from cer-
tainty of title, for the possibility of error is increased when the law of
several states need be considered in order to ascertain whether all parties
in a chain of conveyances had capacity to convey. A non-situs state's
interest based on delivery of the deed within its borders is usually entitled
to less weight-delivery is frequently a fortuitous contact determined by
factors, such as the location of a broker's office, which are not relevant to
the choice-of-law issue.
If a married woman is domiciled in the situs state, X, and the parties
are sufficiently advised to have settlement in Y whose law validates the
conveyance, they should also append a clause designating Y law to govern
the conveyance, and this designation should be implemented. If a married
woman is domiciled in X, and X law upholds the conveyance whereas Y
law invalidates it, X law should be applied regardless of the situs since
there is no conflict-Y has no interest in protecting a non-domiciliary 65
and X law makes it possible to uphold the conveyance. If the situs was
in Y, although Y might have an interest in having its law applied to
facilitate title searches, this interest should be subordinated to the larger
policy of effectuating transfers of land.66 The desire for certainty which
62 Although a purchaser under a contract for sale has an equitable right to the
land, he may not choose to enforce his action for specific performance or specific
performance with abatement after a breach by a vendor. Since only the capacity to
contract of the current parties is relevant, there is no need to consider the convenience
oi applying only one law, presumably that of the situs, to determine whether other
parties in the chain of title had capacity. Whether or not prior contracts culminated
in conveyances, they have no relevance in subsequent transactions.
63 See authorities cited notes 27-28 supra.
64 See note 47 supra.
65 See notes 49-53 supra and accompanying text.
66 See generally authorities cited note 57 supra.
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would obviate litigation should not override the application of the law
of the state having the most significant interest in having its law applied
to the particular case.
Reversing the statutes again so that X law invalidates the contract
whereas Y law upholds it, if the married woman's domicile remains in X
but situs is in Y, situs now becomes a significant contact. Interests which
previously conflicted, such as the need for certainty of title, facilitating
title searches, and upholding the validity of conveyances, aLll combine now
in Y to point to the application of Y law. X's interest in protecting its
domiciliary seems to be outweighed.
C. The Statute of Frauds
Some courts have applied the situs statute of frauds to all contracts to
convey because land was involved.67 However, whether a particular statute
of frauds is applied to an oral contract to convey more often depends on
whether the statute is construed as procedural-and thus applicable only
to suits within the state of enactment-or substantive-and applicable out-
side the state.68 Indeed, in this area, the situs contact is irrelevant. If the
primary purpose of a statute is to prevent -the imposition of fraudulent
evidence on the local courts, it should be considered procedural; but if
a statute is designed to protect contracting parties from fraud, it is sub-
stantive and can be effective only if applied wherever suit is brought.69
Many courts have applied whichever law-situs or contract-validated
the contract on the ground that the parties presumably intended that law
to apply since they meant to make a valid contract. 70 In considering the
presumed intent of the parties, one court 71 noted that the situs statute
should govern, but that it was procedural and therefore applicable only
within the situs state; the court then applied its own statute which it also
construed as procedural. 72  Had the court construed its statute as sub-
stantive, it would have been compelled to uphold an oral contract simply
because neither the substantive statute of the forum nor the procedural
statute of the situs state was applicable.73 This awkward situation could
be avoided if all statutes were construed as substantive or procedural.
Perhaps the policy of procedural statutes--protecting courts from fraud,
perjury, and tedious litigation by prohibiting suit on an oral contract-
should be subordinated to the substantive statutory policy of protecting
67 E.g., Cochran v. Ward, 5 Ind. App. 89, 29 N.E. 795 (1892) ; Meylink v. Rhea,
123 Iowa 310, 98 N.W. 779 (1904).
68 See, e.g., Lams v. F. H. Smith Co., 36 Del. 477, 178 Atl. 651 (Super. Ct.
1935); Halloran v. Jacob Schmidt Brewing Co., 137 Minn. 141, 147, 162 N.W. 1082,
1084 (1917).
6 9 Laes v. F. H. Smith Co., supra note 68.
70 See Ehrenzweig, The Statute of Frauds in the Conflict of Laws: Basic Rules
of Validation, 59 COLUm. L. Rv. 874 (1959).
71 Hamilton v. Glassell, 57 F2d 1032 (5th Cir. 1932).
72 See id. at 1034.
73 See Marie v. Garrison, 13 Abb. N. Cas. 210 (N.Y. 1883).
492 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
domiciliaries from forced compliance with contracts they never made, so
that all statutes of frauds would be construed as substantive.7 4  In fact,
it is generally accepted that statutes of frauds do not prevent fraud in
courts.
7 5
Since there is little variation among the state statutes which would
indicate a substantial difference in policy,781 the best solution may be to
apply whichever statute would validate the contract. A similar "alterna-
tive reference rule" is applied in the area of usury statutes in which the
difference in the maxinmm rate of permissible interest from state to state
is not based on substantial policy distinctions. 77 By applying whichever
statute validates the contract, the presumed intent of the parties to make
a valid contract is effectuated.
78
IV. WEIGHING OF CONTACTS: MORTGAGES
During the period in which many states limited the capacity of
married women to mortgage land, mechanistic application of the contract-
conveyance dichotomy often rendered mortgages worthless. When a
note and mortgage were executed in a state in which the mortgagor
lacked capacity, although she was competent under situs law, the mortgage
was usually upheld as involving a property interest and thus governed by
situs law, whereas the note was invalidated as a mere contract governed
by the law of the place of contracting.7 9 If, according to situs law, a valid
note was required to support a mortgage, the otherwise valid mortgage
would fail. Application of the contract-conveyance dichotomy was un-
warranted because the situs statute probably was intended to require only
that the note be valid under local situs law.
The contract-conveyance dichotomy does, however, furnish appropri-
ate guidelines in certain mortgage cases in which the rights and obliga-
tions involved do not directly affect title to land. When a mortgagor con-
veys his interest in land, the general rule is that the law of the place of
execution and performance governs the issue of whether the grantee as-
sumed the obligation to satisfy the mortgage 80 In the leading case of
Liljedahl v. Glassgow,1 a grantee of mortgaged land did not sign his
name in the blank provided in a deed which had an express assumption
74 See cases cited note 68 supra.
715 See, e.g., Lams v. F. H. Smith Co., 36 Del. 477, 483, 178 At. 651, 653 (Super.
Ct. 1935) ; Lorenzen, supra note 61, at 334-38.
76 See, e.g., Halloran v. Jacob Schmidt Brewing Co., 137 Minn. 141, 147-48, 162
N.W. 1082, 1084 (1917). See generally Ehrenzweig, stpra note 70, at 880.
77 See, e.g., Mueller v. Ober, 172 Minn. 349, 215 N.W. 781 (1927); Castleman v.
Canal Bank & Trust Co., 171 Miss. 291, 156 So. 648 (1934).
78 Cf. GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 88, at 247-48 (3d ed. 1949).
79 Conner v. Elliott, 79 Fla. 513, 85 So. 164, petition for cert. dismissed, 254 U.S.
665 (1920) ; cf. Thompson v. Kyle, 39 Fla. 582, 23 So. 12 (1897).
80 E.g., Duvall-Percival Trust Co. v. Jenkins, 16 F.2d 223 (8th Cir. 1926);
Liljedahl v. Glassgow, 190 Iowa 827, 180 N.W. 870 (1921); Clement v. Willett, 105
Minn. 267, 117 N.W. 491 (1908).
81 190 Iowa 827, 180 N.W. 870 (1921).
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clause. The court held that the grantee had assumed under the law of the
state of execution and performance since the agreement to pay was a
personal covenant, and situs law-under which the grantaee was not liable
to the mortgagee-was inapplicable. Most writers agree that the state in
which the debt is to be paid has a greater interest in determining who
must pay than the state in which the security for the debt happens to be
situated.
8 2
It has also been held that the question of whether a deficiency judg-
ment can be obtained when the amount produced by a foreclosure falls
short of the debt is a contractual matter.83 Here, however, the interest of
a state in protecting local mortgagors should be evaluated by inquiring into
the intended reach of statutes prohibiting deficiency judgments or limiting
recovery to the difference between the debt and the actual value of the
land rather than the proceeds of sale. Thus, in McGirl v. Brewer,
s4 the
forum did not apply its statute to protect a local mortgagor since it held
the statute inapplicable to a mortgagor who executed a mortgage in
another state on land within that state, implying that domicile alone was
an insufficient contact. The court refused to apply forum law on any
basis of procedure or local public policy, 5 nor was it even convinced of
the substantiality of the policy of protecting local mortgagors since a
direct suit on the note, which would achieve the same purpose as a defi-
ciency judgment, was not barred. 86 In similar cases, some courts, in order
to protect local mortgagors, have justified the application of forum law on
grounds of procedure 87 or public policy,8 8 even though most of the con-
tacts were in other states. Such use of the public policy doctrine
8 9 ob-
fuscates the issue of legislative purpose which the court in McGirl v.
Brewer met head-on.
When the situs and place of contracting are in different states, there
is even greater need for considering the scope of particular statutes to
ascertain, for example, if a statute restricting deficiency judgments was
intended to protect local mortgagors only when they mortgaged local
82 See GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LA ws § 149 (3d ed. 1949) ; LEnLAR, CONFLICT OF
LAws § 144, at 277 (1959).
8 3 E.g., Stumpf v. Hallahan, 101 App. Div. 383, 91 N.Y. Supp. 1062 (1905),
aff'd, 185 N.Y. 550, 77 N.E. 1196 (1906) (question of contract but parties must have
intended applicability of law of situs where presumably the debt was payable);
Hall v. Hoff, 295 Pa. 276, 145 Atl. 301 (1929) (place of execution governed).
84 132 Ore. 422, 280 Pac. 508 (1929), afflrmance upheld on rehearing, 132 Ore.
432, 285 Pac. 208 (1930).
85 Ibid.
86 Id. at 436-37, 285 Pac. at 208. See generally Currie & Lieberman, Purchase-
Money Mortgages and State Lines: A Study in Conflict-of-Laws Method, 1960 DUKE
L.J. 1, 21-22.
87 E.g., Bullington v. Angel, 220 N.C. 18, 16 S.E2d 411 (1941).
88 E.g., Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Stensland, 70 S.D. 103, 107, 15 N.W2d 8,
10 (1944).
89 Currie & Lieberman, supra note 86, at 50, citing Watson v. Employers Liab.
Assur. Corp., 348 U.S. 66 (1954), and Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Acc.
Comm'n, 294 U.S. 532 (1935).
494 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol.111:482
land.°0 If a mortgagor resides in the situs state which prohibits or re-
stricts deficiency judgments, and such a judgment is sought in the state
where the mortgage was made and to be paid, which permits such judg-
ments, contacts and interests seem to be evenly balanced until the nature and
purpose of the anti-deficiency judgment statute are considered. In addition
to the usual interest in-protecting its residents, the situs state has an inter-
est in assuring other creditors of the mortgagor, who are likely to live near
the mortgagor in the situs state, a fair share of his assets on default. Un-
like the contract-to-convey cases in which the state of performance has
an interest in upholding the parties' expectations of making a binding
contract, it cannot be said that the state in which a mortgage is to be
satisfied has an interest in upholding the parties' expectations since the
parties probably did not foresee that the value of the land as security might
not be equal to the debt at some future date. Goodrich, too, would tip the
scales in favor of situs law, but on the somewhat tenuous ground that
the mortgagee, having obtained foreclosure in the situs, should be held to
have submitted disposition of his entire claim to the situs courts.0 1 On
the other hand, the Restatement argues that a mortgagee's right to collect
a deficiency should be governed by the law of the place of the underlying
debt since title to land is not affected and since all collateral foreclosure
matters should be governed by a single law. 92 Nevertheless, although title is
not affected, the domicile-situs does have an interest in protecting a local
mortgagor which seems to outweigh the convenience of applying only one
law to the transaction, particularly when there is no interest in upholding
the expectations of the parties.
V. WEIGHING OF CONTACTS: LEGAL EFFECT AND CONSTRUCTION
OF CONVEYANCES
The Restatement 93 provides that situs law governs not only when
state statutes, in implementing local public policy, require that certain
words in a conveyance have a definite legal effect regardless of the mean-
ing intended by the parties,94 but also when, in the absence of such
statutes or satisfactory evidence of intent,95 a conveyance must be con-
90 See Hall v. Hoff, 295 Pa. 276, 145 At. 301 (1929).
91 GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 152, at 469 & n.68 (3d ed. 1949). Of course,
if the issue is merely what steps must be taken in order to recover a deficiency, the
question is procedural. Cf. Belmont v. Cornen, 48 Conn. 338 (1880) (recovering
deficiency without court action governed by forum law).
92RESTATE-MENT (SECOND), CONFLICT OF LAWS §227, comment d & Reporter's
Note (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1959).
93 RESTATE-MENT (SECOND), CONFLICT OF LAWS § 214 (Tent Draft No. 5, 1959).
94 Id. § 214, comment b.
95 If such evidence is presented, the intent of the parties will normally be effectu-
ated. See id. § 214, comment c. The Restatement distinguishes between interpretation
-construing words in accordance with the intent of the parties established by satis-
factory evidence-and construction-construing words in accordance with a presump-
tion in the absence of sufficient evidence of intent. Id. § 214, comments a, c, d.
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strued by applying a presumption normally based on probable intent.96
That situs law should be determinative of the legal effect of words in a
conveyance seems justified in terms of the interest of the situs state in
obtaining uniformity and certainty of titles to land within its borders. If,
for example, A conveys to B for life, then to his heirs, the legal effect of
these words would vary significantly if differing statutes modifying or
overruling the Rule in Shelley's Case were applicable rather than just one-
the situs statute. Also, title searches, usually made in the situs state where
deeds are recorded, would be even more onerous than at present if the
laws of the various states in which past grantors were domiciled rather
than just situs law had to be consulted.
9 7
When the issue is construction of a conveyance rather than its legal
effect, the interest in facilitating title searches through the application of
a single situs law carries little weight. Although a title searcher can rely
on a statute which determines legal effect regardless of the intention of the
parties, he cannot so rely on a rule of construction which can be overcome
by evidence of a contrary intent. 8 In addition, a legal-effect issue com-
monly concerns future interests or the rights and duties of life tenants and
remaindermen, and since lawyers tend to think of the relevant real prop-
erty law in territorial terms, 9  it seems appropriate that situs law should
apply. Rules of construction, however, 'often appear to be no more
closely related to property than to the parties.100 And in contrast to
legal-effect rules which, by disregarding intent, evidence a strong state
policy, many rules of construction are arbitrary-based not even on
probable intent. Therefore, the Restatement may have overemphasized
the importance of situs in relation to construction of conveyances. 101
At one point, however, the Restatement does approach the problem
by considering specific factual situations, noting that many courts dis-
tinguish between conveyances supported by consideration and gift con-
veyances on the ground that when a gift is made only the donor's intent
is relevant.10 2  For gift conveyances, the Restatement urges that the
construction common in the grantor's domicile be applied-a person
normally speaks the language of his home, and unless the construction of
906RESTATEMENT (SECOND), CONFLICT OF LAWS § 214, comment d (Tent. Draft
No. 5, 1959).
97 See generally Goodrich, Two States and Real Estate, 89 U. PA. L. REv. 417,
419 (1941).
9S RESTATEMENT (SECOND), CONFLICT OF LAWS § 214, comment d (Tent. Draft
No. 5, 1959). See generally Note, Choice-of-Law Rules for the Construction and
Interpretation of Written Instrumcnts, 72 HARV. L. REv. 1154, 1160 (1959).
99 See generally Goodrich, -supra note 97, at 419.
100 Note, supra note 98, at 1159.
101 Accord, Peet v. Peet, 229 Ill. 341, 82 N.E. 376 (1907) ; Jennings v. Jennings,
21 Ohio St. 56 (1871). Contra, Greenwood v. Page, 138 F.2d 921 (D.C. Cir. 1943);
Rose v. Ranbo, 120 Miss. 305, 82 So. 149 (1919).
102 RESTATEMENT (SECOND), CONFLICT OF LAWS § 214, comment d (Tent. Draft
No. 5, 1959).
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his domicile is applied, words in a single instrument conveying land in
several states could be construed to have varying meanings. 0 3 Although
the construction of the grantor's domicile might be applied in all situa-
tions,'04 better results are more likely to be obtained when that state's
rule which is based on the probable intent of the parties is applied. If
both state rules have a rational basis, the law of the grantor's domicile
should prevail since presumably it is more likely to represent probable
intent than the situs rule. If both rules are arbitrary, application of the
rule of the grantor's domicile 105 may afford as reasonable a solution as is
possible; at least uniformity of result regardless of forum can be achieved
if the choice between two arbitrary rules is always resolved in favor of the
grantor's domicile.'0 6
VI. CONCLUSION
Only by analyzing the significance of a transaction's contacts with
various states through a consideration of the purposes of local laws is it
possible consistently to select the law of the state having the greatest in-
terest in seeing its law govern the transaction. Neither mechanistic appli-
cation of the contract-conveyance dichotomy nor complete acceptance of
the Restatement's emphasis on situs law seems adequate. The analytical
approach urged by this Note seeks not to provide rules of thumb for
selected fact situations, but to untangle conflicting policies so as to dis-
cover the proper law of a given case.
Susan P. Windle
103 Ibid. The Restatement then indicates that a lawyer may intend that a con-
veyance be construed in accordance with situs law because of situs control over the
land. However, if a lawyer considered problems of future construction, he should
have provided that a certain law was intended to govern. Such a provision would
be given effect since rules of construction are applied only in the absence of sufficient
evidence of intent. See In re Adriance's Estate, 158 Misc. 857, 286 N.Y. Supp. 936
(Surr. Ct. 1936).
104 See generally Note, supra note 98, at 1159-60.
105 See authorities cited notes 103-04 supra.
10 6 Cf. RESTATEIENT (SECOND), CONFLICT OF LAws §214, comment d (Tent.
Draft No. 5, 1959), which suggests that whatever rule-that of grantor's domicile
or of the situs-situs courts apply to a gift conveyance of land should be applied by
other forums.
